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The rapid development of the Internet as a cornerstone of private and social life has provoked 
a growing effort by law enforcement and security agencies to understand what role the 
Internet plays in terrorism. Paul Gill, Emily Corner, Maura Conway, Amy Thornton, Mia 
Bloom, and John Horgan’s (2017, this issue)<AUTHOR’s> effort to identify empirically 
when and how terrorists engage with the Internet is thus timely and important. Understanding 
when terrorists use the Internet is valuable for investigators who must evaluate the immediacy 
of the risk posed by a suspect or cell. Knowing the typical patterns of use (or lack of use) can 
facilitate inferences about a cell’s preparedness, the nature of their its support, and even the 
goal of their its attack. Understanding how terrorists use the Internet is essential for policy 
makers who must construct legislation to deter citizens from terrorism while at the same time 
retaining their rights to freedom. This is arguably best accomplished by legislation targeted at 
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a narrow set of Internet uses that are, as far as possible, exclusively associated with illegal 
actions. 
In this policy essay, we focus on two of <AUTHOR’s>Gill et al.’s (2017) main 
contributions. We argue that, subject to robust independent replication, they encourage 
thought about the functions of the Internet for terrorists, which in turn may have implications 
that offer useful guidance for policy and practice. Alongside the articlepaper’s conceptual 
contributions, the authorsGill et al. also assert to have resolved severala number of pragmatic 
challenges and we suggest ways in which their solutions, if developed fully, could offer value 
to the security analyst community. Finally, we take stock of where the Gill et al.’s 
<AUTHOR’s> contribution has left us and review the next steps. 
 
Differences in Internet Use 
A central finding of Gill et al. (2017)<AUTHOR> is that terrorists’ motivations and 
intentions make a significant difference to how and when they use the Internet. Their data 
reveal that a use of the Internet depends largely on the needs of the terrorist and on the 
opportunities afforded to him or her both offline and online. For example, Gill et 
al.<AUTHOR’s> show that terrorists who seek to undertake sophisticated attacks (e.g., IED 
attacks) tend to seek facts on how to conduct such attacks online, since because presumably 
that knowledge is not so easily available offline. Similarly, Gill et al. <AUTHOR> find that 
terrorists engaging in a geographically distributed network are more likely to use the Internet 
for more interpersonal activities because, since for these individuals, those opportunities are 
less available offline.  
These differences, although descriptive rather than inferential, demonstrate for 
investigators the value that can come from systematically thinking about what a suspect or 
suspect cell needs, and where the opportunity might lie for those needs to be met. Identifying 
   
needs (e.g., information, andor co-ideologues) and opportunity should allow inferences about 
how a suspect cell is likely to go about planning itstheir attack or seeking additional 
information or input. Such inferences then allow the prioritization of investigative resource. 
For example, as part of a risk assessment, an investigator might consider: , “What’s missing 
from a cell?” “Does that mean they it will need to look online?” “If they it does, then we 
should focus our online investigations on seeking evidence that the cell is pursuing such a 
resource. There may also be opportunity for secondary inferences. For example, perhaps 
there is an obvious affordance online. An investigator might ask, “Wwhy hasn’t the cell taken 
advantage of this?” “Is this non-use related to operational security or to , a lack of good 
investigative coverage, or does it mean that the cell is not a credible threat?” These kinds of 
inference may allow investigators to focus their work on credible threats and to identify 
appropriate interventions that dissuade the cell from progressing itstheir attack.  
The differences across groups observed by Gill et al. (2017) <AUTHORS> allow for 
similar inferences about what to expect and, thus, where to seek evidence to inform a risk 
assessment. The differences observed between far-right and Islamist extremist realms suggest 
that the militant opportunities and experiences embedded in each affect how those who 
identify with these realms use the Internet. For example, the <AUTHOR’s>Gill et al. observe 
that “extreme-right-wing offenders were significantly more likely to learn online than were 
Jihadist-inspired individuals“Extreme right-wing offenders were significantly more likely to 
learn online than Jihadist inspired individuals.” As the <AUTHOR’s>Gill et al. argue, this is 
perhaps because there are and have been far fewer physical spaces for those identifying with 
the far-right to gain practical skills. The absence of opportunity for offline interaction appears 
seems to be leading extreme- right-wing offenders to utilize use the Internet for learning. 
Thus, as this example demonstrates, an investigative team can determine where they it might 
expect to find intelligence on a new threat based on what affordance the suspects have offline 
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and online. If it will be difficult for a cell to interact offline, then investigators might focus 
resources on online social media channels that provide an equivalent opportunity to interact. 
Investigators may also be able to extend such inferences to what might happen to the cell 
should some form of police intervention take place. The removal of an affordance will see it 
displaced elsewhere, from offline to online, from one forum to another, and so on.  
 
Internet as Facilitator Not Instigator 
A second argument in the papermade by Gill et al. (2017), which has large implications for 
policy, is the observation that radicalization and attack planning are not dependent on the 
Internet, and that the Internet “is largely a facilitative tool that affords greater opportunities 
(p. 23).” That is, the actor goes to the Internet as a resource for finding information once 
motivated to do so, and the Internet does not play a large role at pushing such information 
onto a vulnerable consumer. This finding is consequential because it contrasts findings from 
the last 20 years of general research on technology use that argues forsuggest a complex 
inter-play between technological innovation and social and economic factors (Williams &and 
Edge, 1996). The results of rResearch on the “‘social shaping’ shaping” of technology (e.g., 
MacKenzie &and Wajcman, 1999) suggests reveal that we shape technology as much as we 
are in turn influenced by the decisions made by designers, or the content it provides 
(Williams &and Edge, 1996). For practitioners, this means that use of the Internet needs to be 
considered from neither from a simple ‘“technologically deterministic’ deterministic” 
standpoint (e.g., “Internet causes radicalization”), nor as simply as a socially neutral “‘tool’.” 
From the perspective of this past literature, the <AUTHOR’s>Gill et al.’s (2017) 
conclusion that the Internet is an enabler but not a cause is correct. HoweverNevertheless, 
practitioners should be cautious not to interpret it in a manner that is overly deterministic. For 
example, the recent 2016 U.S. election has raised considerable discussion around the role of 
   
technology (specifically social media) in propagating “‘false news’ news” and ‘“filter 
bubbles’ bubbles” (IsaacNew York Times, 2016). While Although there is still debate and 
analysis to be conducted, one lesson from the U.S. election is clear: Facebook was neither a 
cause, nor a simple “‘enabler’,” but rather there was a complex interplay between among 
social validation, algorithmic filtering, and false news, whose impact is as yet uncertain. For 
policy makers and practitioners, the challenge is not one of treating the terrorists and their 
Internet use as separate entities, but rather of treating them as two components of a single, 
complex socio-technical system. <AUTHOR’s> paperGill et al. sheds some light on that 
system. 
The difference between Gill et al.’s (2017)the <AUTHOR’s> findings and that of 
researchers in other disciplines highlights two further interrelated challenges that are faced 
when observing Internet behavior. First, what is the true effect of the material on presumed 
“‘learning’?” Do crude open- source searches that obfuscate more than clarify an issue 
constitute online learning? Might the vast volumes of data available online through, for 
instance, torrent downloads complicate the applicability of this learning in practice? The 
Internet does not necessarily provide targeted answers, and too much information can be just 
as unhelpful as no information at all. We might even argue that online “‘engagement”’ offers 
parallels to engagement in the offline world and that, in doing so, the Internet disrupts or 
complicates pathways that lead to offline collaboration. Many prominent extremist texts that 
have been popular with convicted terrorists in the United Kingdom (e.g., the booklet “’39 
Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad’Jihad”) emphasize precisely such an online-–offline 
dynamic. As Ramsay (2013: , p. 286) observeds, “it would seem, paradoxically, that the 
online violent radical milieu may actually generate its own positive reasons for non-
engagement” by developing “a set of meaningful and, so it would seem, pleasurable practices 
of its own.”  
   
Second, what are the secondary uses of online information? If one member of the cell 
downloads material and then shares it through offline means, the footprint of Internet use is 
less but the role of the Internet is equivalent. Given this, inferences such as “lone-actors 
require more online learning” made by Gill et al. (2017) (p. 23) are at risk of being 
misinterpretations of incomplete evidence. So how can we move from a snapshot of a 
behavior to a fuller understanding of the purpose of a behavior within the context of other 
actors and their behaviors? Fortunately, because investigators often have access to 
information not just on when something is used but also on what occurs after the points of 
use and the context in which such use occurs (Klein, Moon, &and Hoffman, 2006), they can 
determine the qualitative value of each behavior and resolve some of these complications. At 
least they can up to a point. 
One framework that may support investigator thinking about the opportunities offered 
by the Internet is the classic three-part classification of communication motivation. Within 
this framework, the Internet is seen perceived as affording a terrorist the opportunity to 
address instrumental (i.e., about substantive needs such as information), identity (i.e., about 
identity and ideological belief), and relational (i.e., about social affiliations and connections) 
goals (Taylor, 2014). This categorization has proven effective in understanding the purpose 
and construction of extremist and counter-extremist messaging (Prentice, Rayson, &and 
Taylor, 2012; Prentice, Taylor, Rayson, Hoskins, &and O’Loughlin, 2011), and so it may be 
valuable to untangling the facilitative versuss. causal effects of the Internet. Table 1 presents 
<AUTHOR’s>Gill et al.’s (2017) findings as a function of communicative goals and whether 
the Internet was used by terrorists to instigate or facilitate involvement. In completing Table 
1, we have inevitably simplified the intended purpose of different forms of engagement and a 
more critical analysis may reveal important nuances. Nevertheless, what begins to emerge 
from this kind of assessment is where the gaps in affordance appear to be. The Internet is 
   
largely facilitative when it comes to instrumental goals, but it plays a more fundamental 
instigator role when it comes to relational goals.  
A framework like that shown in Table 1 may allow an investigator to think critically 
about how a terrorist cell is addressing its various goals (if they are at all). Investigators are 
likely to have an advantage over <AUTHOR>Gill et al. (2017) in completing such a table as 
they are able tocan layer on top of this initial picture two important facets of Internet use. 
First, investigators may have more information on day-to-day communicative uses by 
terrorist suspects of Internet-based platforms (e.g., Twitter or , WhatsApp; Charitonidis, 
Rashid, &and Taylor, 2015) and they can glean a clearer picture of what relational needs and 
resources are being sought. Second, their fine-grained picture can help investigators 
determine if whether there are greater nuances in terms of how the nature of usage plays out. 
For example, whilst although it seems intuitive that those seeking to organize complex plots 
using IEDs are likely to “have learned online,” (p. 19), as Gill et al. state, it is conceivable 
that the purpose of the Internet use in this instance was not to learn but to check on the 
authenticity of information provided offline.  
 
Collaboration and Mechanisms as Next Steps 
The <AUHTOR’s>Gill et al.’s (2017) findings support the current investigative practice of 
considering offline and online behavior jointly when investigating terrorists (von Behr, 
Reding, Edwards, &and Gribbon, 2013). Investigators tend to focus on considering different 
groups rather than people at different stages in their ‘“career’ career” or people in different 
contexts, and this approach fits nicely with <AUTHOR’s>Gill et al.’s suggestion of 
considering affordances. The proposal to not differentiate online and offline activity also 
provides timely support to government investment decisions in relation to security, at least in 
the United Kingdom. The 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy, which pledges to invest 
   
£1.9 billion over the next five 5 years, distinguishes cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled 
offending, thereby recognizing the important offline element of many crimes and echoing the 
distinction between facilitator and cause. 
<AUTHOR’s>Gill et al.’s (2017) findings go beyond supporting current practice to 
highlight the value of increased collaboration. While the <AUTHOR’s>Although their 
statistical contribution helps prioritize what information should be used by investigators, 
investigators are able tocan say what information may be collected at low cost (e.g., low 
intrusion) and with more reliability. Collaboration will, therefore, help researchers avoid the 
challenges of exploring the connections between terrorist behavior and pre-arrest activities by 
using only open- source data. For example, the suggestion in <AUTHOR>Gill et al. that 
“only a minority (44%) of cases actually included extremist (ideological) material” (p. 14) is 
significant because it raises fundamental questions about why these cases were defined as 
“‘terroristic”’ to begin with. If the majority ofmost convicted terrorists did not collect 
extremist material, how does this affect our understanding of the way in which political and 
ideological dimensions are used to label acts or attempted acts (and relevant support activity) 
as terrorism? The explanation might rest on the fact that the details of the material found are 
not necessarily presented at court, depending on the nature of the case, and then not 
necessarily reported fully in the press, depending on what was deemed relevant or interesting 
(cf. Sageman, 2014). The combination of researcher and investigator perspectives is thus a 
more holistic picture of what is known and what can be accomplished through criminological 
analyses. 
In a search to understand affordance, researchers and investigators will need to 
unpackdiscover??unpick the mechanisms that underpin the behaviors observed by 
<AUTHOR>Gill et al. (2017). This is essential if we are to move from description to 
inference and if we are to be confident in our inferences about 
   
DISTINGUISNG??distinguishing new cases from the old ones. <AUTHOR>Gill et al. lay 
out many predictions that researchers could explore in this regard. For example, they 
highlight the Internet as a potential place of learning, but precisely how terrorists go about 
consuming and consolidating any such online learning, and how that interfaces with the 
indirect learning that comes from social interaction, is not yet understood. They argue for 
choice when suggesting that the Internet is a ??faciltatorfacilitator. Understanding the 
mechanisms behind when and how such choices are made will offer researchers insights into 
the role of the Internet in terrorism and offer investigators insights into the efficacy of using 
Internet behavior as a marker of threat.  
 
Conclusions 
<AUTHOR>Gill et al. (2017) conducted an admirable data collection and analysis that gives 
a compelling demonstration of the value of considering the affordances that online, offline, 
and “‘sub-contexts”’ in both of these environments bring to a terrorist. Their take- home 
message for investigators and policy makers, at least for us, is to (1a) continue to treat online 
and offline as two sides of the same coin, where one might compensate for a lack in the other, 
and vice -versa; and to (b2) develop frameworks for systematically evaluating how a 
particular threat may make use of offline and online affordances, by using such assessment to 
guide both risk assessment and intervention strategies. 
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Instrumental Identity Relational 
Instigator 
Provide material support (6%)  Propaganda (15%) 
Recruit others (9%) 




Learn about activity (54%)  
Attack preparation (32%) 
Overcome attack hurdle (10%) 
 
Extremist media (44%) 
Ideological content (30%) 
Legitimization for future actions (5%) 
Signal plan prior to attack (5%) 
 
Communicate w/ others (29%) 
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